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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Defendant/Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
RAMIRO JR. OSEGUERA, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee. ] 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
I DistCt. Case No. 011905347 
) Ct. App. Case No. 20110274-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Mr. Oseguera ("Appellant") filed this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of 
the Utah Rules Appellate Procedure. This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over 
this third degree felony or class A misdemeanor conviction, which necessitated the 
post-conviction motion to reduce degree of conviction pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§78A-4-103(e), (f) (1953, as amended). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the district court incorrectly 
interpreted the import of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-402 (2010) (which should 
have been read and interpreted in harmony with Utah Code Ann. Sections 76-3-
104 (West 2010) and 76-3-204(West 2010)) by concluding that Section 402(2) 
1 
does not allow for a corresponding reduction of sentence imposed on Appellant as 
required by Sections 104 and 204. 
A subsumed or corollary issue is whether the district court should also have 
applied the rule of lenity to find that the ameliorative nature of Section 402 
required that the parties' stipulated motion to clarify judgment and to reduce the 
corresponding sentence imposed on the reduced conviction be granted in the 
interest of justice, particularly given the State's confession of error on violation of 
Appellant's substantive Sixth Amendment rights. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND PROPRIETY OF REVIEW 
The issues raised here were properly reserved below. See R. 59. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented involve questions of law and are reviewed de novo by 
this Court, without deference to the District Court. See State v. Quintana, 447 
Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 48 P.3d 249 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 
1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In other words, statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law. State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 322,17, 14 P.3d 129, 131; Ward 
v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). A fortiori, Utah appellate courts 
review questions of law under a correction of error standard, without deference to 
the trial court. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P.2d 
at 759. 
2 
APPELLANT'S CUSTODY STATUS 
Defendant-Appellant is currently detained by the Department of Homeland 
Security at the Utah County Jail, in Spanish Fork, Utah until he is removed from 
the United States. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to 
resolving this case, the relevant portion of which are reproduced verbatim in 
Addendum C. 
1. U. S. Const, amend. VI; 
2. Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-104 (West 2010); 
3. Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-204(1) (West 2010); and 
4. Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-402 (West 2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the Honorable Noel S. 
Hyde, Second Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah, finding and 
concluding that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402(2) (2010) does not authorize a 
change in the underlying sentence and only allows modification of the degree of 
offense of conviction. R.63; Addendum A. In essence, the district court denied 
3 
the parties' Stipulated Emergency Motion to Clarify Judgment on 402 Motion 
notwithstanding the state's confession of error. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition 
On January 22 2001, Appellant entered a guilty plea for one count of theft, a 
third degree felony. See Docket at 5; R.28. The plea included a promise by the 
State to recommend Section 76-3-402 "treatment" at the time of sentencing. Id. 
The record, however, does not show that such recommendation was made. See 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment Order, R. 47. On or about March 7 2002, 
Appellant was sentenced to zero to five years in prison for the third degree felony 
conviction; the prison term was suspended in lieu of a 60-day jail term. R. 47. 
Subsequently, in February 2010, in his quest to obtain better employment, 
Appellant filed a. pro se motion for reduction of degree of conviction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-402. See R. 54-56. On or about March 12 2010, 
after a hearing, the District Court (Judge Pamela Heffernan) reduced Appellant's 
conviction from a third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor, but the court did 
not reduce the corresponding sentence. See R.58. 
In January 2011, the State stipulated to an emergency motion to clarify 
judgment and to impose a corresponding sentence of 360 days on Appellant's 
misdemeanor conviction. See R. 59. On January 31 2011, the parties filed a 
stipulated motion for clarification of judgment - to clarify the sentence imposed on 
4 
Appellant and correlate such to the reduced degree of conviction. See R.59; 
Addendum B. By this time, Judge Heffernan had retired. Judge Noel S. Hyde, 
who then presided over the case, denied the stipulated motion to clarify judgment 
on March 4 2011, finding that Section 402(2) did not authorize him to allow a 
corresponding reduction of sentence with a reduction of degree of conviction. See 
R.66. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal on March 22 2011. See R.70. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since at 
least January 9, 1989. See Addendum D. On or about November 21 2001, 
Appellant was charged with one count of Theft, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. R.3. Pursuant to negotiations between Appellant 
and the State, Appellant entered a guilty plea on January 22 2002, to Theft, as 
charged. See R.28. The State specifically agreed to "recommend 402 treatment at 
the time of sentencing." See Docket at 5; see also R. 28 . On March 5 2002, the 
District Court sentenced Appellant to a zero to five years prison term which 
corresponded with the 3rd degree felony conviction. See Docket at 5. 
On or about March 12 2010, the District Court (Judge Heffernan) reduced 
Appellant's conviction from a third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor 
pursuant to a motion filed pro se under Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-402. R. 58. 
The District Court, however, did not reduce Appellant's corresponding jail term of 
5 
less than one year to the reduced class A misdemeanor conviction. See id. 
Subsequently, on or about September 29 2010, Appellant was placed in 
removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") because 
the conviction and the sentence imposed upon him in the District Court constituted 
an "aggravated felony" under federal law. See NT A, Addendum D. Appellant was 
thus detained by DHS without the possibility of bond as a result of the conviction 
entered by the District Court. 
Subsequent to the District Court granting Appellant's pro se Section 402 
motion reducing the degree of his conviction, Appellant, through counsel, filed a 
Stipulated Motion to Clarify Judgment on January 31 2011. R.59. Pursuant to that 
motion, the State agreed that the plea underlying Appellant's conviction was 
indeed constitutionally suspect due to inadequate advice by former counsel. See 
R.59; Addendum B. In essence, Appellant alleged (and the State agreed) that he 
was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel even at the plea stage of 
proceedings. Id. However, Appellant modestly and solely sought to have the 
District Court clarify the degree of his conviction and the attendant sentence 
imposed on such reduced conviction, pursuant to Sections 204 and 402, rather than 
seek outright vacatur of the underlying guilty plea as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Padilla} See R. 59 (stipulated motion, citing Padilla). 
1
 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. , 130 S.Ct.1473, 173 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) 
6 
Nevertheless, on March 4 2011 (after Judge Heffernan retired), Judge Noel S. 
Hyde denied the stipulated motion to clarify judgment on the ground that, in his 
opinion, Section 402(2) does not authorize reduction of sentence when the degree 
of a conviction is reduced from third degree felony to class A misdemeanor. See 
R. 63, 66; Addendum B. This appeal then followed. See R.70. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The district court incorrectly interpreted Section 76-3-402 and erroneously 
concluded that a district court cannot reduce a corresponding sentence when it 
reduces the degree of a conviction, notwithstanding the parties' stipulation. The 
district court's decision is erroneous for various reasons. 
First, as this has found, the major benefit of a reduction in degree of 
conviction is the corresponding reduction of sentence. It would be unduly harsh 
and contrary to the interests of justice to impose upon Appellant a sentence for a 
felony when the degree of his conviction has been reduced to a misdemeanor; 
especially in the instant case where the Appellant is a non-citizen and will be 
deported based on the sentence that was imposed. 
(holding that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise non-citizen 
defendant of immigration consequences of a plea). 
7 
Second, Section 76-3-402 should be read as a whole and should be construed 
in favor of Appellant. Each subsection helps to define how the statute should be 
applied and the subsections do not act independently. Although 402(2) deals 
specifically with probation compliance, it should still be read with the entire 
statutory scheme which has the purpose of ameliorating the harshness of a 
conviction and thus allows for fairness to govern the conviction and corresponding 
sentence when the results would be unduly harsh. The district court's reliance on a 
Tenth Circuit decision for the proposition that subsections (1) and (2) of section 
76-3-402 are to be read separately or in isolation from other Utah statutes ~ such 
as Sections 76-3-104 and 76-3-204 ~ was misplaced and fails in the face of well-
established principles of statutory construction laid down by this Court. 
Third, the district court's interpretation of Section 76-3-402 is incongruous 
with the legislative purpose for enacting the statute and frustrates the Legislature's 
intended goals of rehabilitating defendants by incentivizing them to complete 
probation. During the 2007 Senate floor debates, Senator Bell explained that 
Section 402(2) allows a reduction of sentence even after probation. Thus the 
district court erred in finding that Section 76-3-402(2) does not permit a reduction 
of sentence after a reduction in the degree of conviction after Appellant completed 
his probation requirements. Indeed, the plain language of section 402(1) clearly 
allows a reduction in sentence. Even if there is any ambiguity in the statute via 
8 
section 402(2), the legislative history of the 2007 amendments removes any such 
ambiguity, and clarifies that the reduction of degree of conviction and reduction of 
sentence go hand in hand. If it were not so, the Legislature's intent in creating the 
statute as an incentive to complete probation would be undermined. 
Fourth, imposing a sentence of up to five years in prison for a class A 
misdemeanor conviction is unlawful, and therefore Judge Hyde's imposition of 
such term constitutes an illegal sentence. Under Section 76-3-204, a class A 
misdemeanor conviction carries a term of imprisonment "not exceeding one year." 
See U.C.A. § 76-3-204. Accordingly, it would be fundamentally unfair and illegal 
to convict a defendant of a misdemeanor and yet sentence him to the harsher 
penalty of a felony when he is undeserving of that type of conviction. Therefore 
Appellant's sentence of zero to five years in this case for a class A misdemeanor is 
unduly harsh, unfair and unlawful. 
Point II 
The district court should have applied the rule of lenity to find that the 
ameliorative nature of 76-3-402 requires that a motion to clarify judgment be 
granted in the interest of justice, particularly where the parties stipulated to the 
propriety of such reduction. Stipulation by the parties in a criminal case is entitled 
to deference by the courts. When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as 
to the existence of a fact, a judge may accept the stipulation as evidence and regard 
9 
that fact as proved. Given the State's confession of error on the substantive law, 
and particularly given the parties' stipulation that appellant's sentence be reduced 
to 360 days, the district court should have allowed the reduction of sentence, and in 
the case of any doubt or confusion as to whether or not Section 76-3-402 allowed a 
reduction of sentence, the court should have applied the rule of lenity and resolved 
the ambiguity in favor of the appellant. 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant urges this Court to find that the district 
court erred as a matter of law and abused discretion by refusing to grant a reduced 
sentence in conjunction with the granting of a reduced degree of conviction 
pursuant to Sections 76-3-204 and 76-3-402. The Court should also find that the 
district court erred in refusing to give deference to parties' stipulated motion to 
clarify judgment, particularly given the State's confession of error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 76-3-402 AND ERRONEOUSLY 
CONCLUDED THAT THE DISTRICT COURT CANNOT REDUCE A 
CORRESPONDING SENTENCE WHEN IT REDUCES THE DEGREE OF 
A CONVICTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PARTIES' STIPULATION. 
A. The Major Benefit of a Reduction in Degree of Conviction is the 
Corresponding Reduction of Sentence; Accordingly, it Would Be Unduly Harsh 
and Contrary to the Interests of Justice to Impose on Appellant a Sentence for a 
Felony When the Degree of His Conviction has been Reduced to a Misdemeanor. 
Our system of justice is built on a foundation of fairness. When a court 
understands the nature and circumstances of the offense, considers the history and 
10 
character of the defendant, and concludes that it would be "unduly harsh" to record 
a conviction as established by statute, the court may enter a judgment for the next 
lower degree "and impose sentence accordingly" See Utah Code § 76-3-402(1) 
(emphasis added). After the completion of probation, the court may reduce the 
degree of offense "if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next 
lower degree of offense is in the interest of justice." § 76-3-402(2)(e). Indeed, the 
statute itself recognizes that the purpose of Section 402 it to ameliorate the harsh 
effects of our structured criminal statutes when individual circumstances are 
deserving. See id. 
In fact, this Court has recognized that one of the primary purposes of 
allowing a reduced sentence is to allow the deserving defendant to enjoy the 
advantages associated with such reduction. See State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 244 
(Utah Ct. App. 199^). It is also well established that "a guilty defendant who is 
considered worthy of a reduced sentence should receive all the advantages that go 
with such leniency." Id. {quoting State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah App.), 
cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)). Cf. State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 1340, 1342 
(Utah 1974) ("We have heretofore held in Belt v. Turner, and State v. Tapp, that if 
the penalty for an offense is reduced prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment"). 
11 
Further, the "time honored rules of the criminal law" mandate that "in case 
of doubt or uncertainty" an accused is entitled to a lesser degree of crime "and 
correlated thereto[,]" a more lenient punishment. State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 393, 
394-95, 490 P.2d 334, 336 (1971) (footnotes omitted). Cf. State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 385 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 232, 479 
P.2d 791, 792-93, affdon reh'g, 25 Utah 2d 380, 381-82, 483 P.2d 425, 426 
(1971) ("A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime represents a 
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is sufficient to 
meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is to be gained by imposing 
the more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; the excess in punishment can, 
by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance"). 
In sum, the "reduced sentence" and the "advantages attendant" to such 
sentence are the determinative consequences of a conviction. See Gurr, 904 P.2d at 
244. In other words, the categorization of a conviction as misdemeanor rather than 
a felony is really "inconsequential" to a criminal defendant. See id. What really 
matters to a defendant is the sentence received as a result of a guilty plea rather 
than the title or degree of conviction. 
Accordingly, Section 402 is available to reduce the degree of the charged 
crime "for sentencing purposes" when it would be "unduly harsh" to record the 
conviction as charged. See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 127 P.3d 682, 684 (citing 
12 
§ 76-3-402(1)). For example, in Barrett, the defendant filed a motion requesting a 
one-degree reduction of charges "for sentencing purposes." Id. at \4. The 
defendant "subsequently received sentences corresponding" to the lesser degree 
charge. Id. at f 5. The Utah Supreme Court in Barrett understood that a reduction 
of degree or enhancement results in the "accompanying" reduction of sentence. 
See id. at |46 ("Under the proper interpretation of the relevant statutes, the 
defendant's offense should have been reduced to simple first degree felonies with 
accompanying prison terms of five years to life"). 
In the instant case, Appellant was convicted of, and sentenced on, a third 
degree felony with a zero to five year prison term. However, both the prosecutor 
and the District Court, Judge Heffernan, apparently recognized that (he nature and 
circumstances of the offense would make it unduly harsh and contrary to the 
interest of justice to subject Appellant to the statutory punishment for a third 
degree felony of zero to five years. In addition, Appellant completed his requisite 
probation period and merited a reduced conviction. See R. 57. Therefore, Judge 
Heffernan lowered the conviction by one degree from a felony to a class A 
misdemeanor, pursuant to Section 76-3-402(2). R.58. However, by mere oversight 
and primarily because Appellant filed the 402 motion pro se9 Judge Heffernan 
failed to "impose sentence accordingly." See Rule 52(d), Utah R. Civ. P; Rule 30, 
Utah R. Crim. P. (authorizing the court to correct and amend the record and 
13 
relevant findings made by the Court). Subsequently, through counsel, Appellant 
filed a Stipulated Motion to Clarify Judgment on January 31 2011 (wherein the 
State agreed that Defendant's plea was constitutionally suspect due to inadequate 
advice), and sought to have the District Court impose a corresponding sentence. 
See Addendum B. Appellant's limited request is clearly consistent with the Utah 
supreme court precedent in Barrett, where the defendant "subsequently received 
sentences corresponding" to the lesser charges. Barrett, 2005 UT 88 at | 5 . 
Further, Appellant's unique circumstance as a permanent resident of the 
United States significantly augments the harshness of the illegal sentence imposed 
on him as a result of Judge Hyde's decision. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that deportation is "intimately related to the criminal process." See 
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. If Appellant is removed from the United States as a 
result of this sentence, it will be a "particularly severe penalty." Id. See also 
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391 (1947) (explaining that 
deportation is a severe penalty and is "the equivalent of banishment or exile"). 
If the sentence is reduced as requested by Appellant - as it originally should 
have been in order to correspond to the reduced degree of conviction - then 
Appellant will be able to stay in the United States. On the other hand, if Judge 
Hyde's decision is allowed to stand, then Appellant will be deported as an 
aggravated felon. See INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any 
14 
alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is 
deportable"). See also INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (providing 
that a theft offense with a term of imprisonment for at least one year is an 
aggravated felony); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, f38, 125 P.3d 930, 938 
(2005), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 147 (2010), 
(Durham, J. dissenting) (recognizing certainty of deportation for aggravated 
felons). As such, deportation will be an "unduly harsh" penalty for a conviction 
for a class A misdemeanor. Additionally, it would be contrary to the "interests of 
justice." Recognizing this much, and essentially recognizing that it "has nothing to 
gain by imposing the more severe penalty," see Patience, 944 P.2d at 385, the 
State stipulated to the merits of Appellant's supplemental section 402 motion. See 
R. 59. 
Accordingly, because Appellant has proven himself worthy of a reduced 
degree of conviction, he is also justified in receiving "all of the advantages that go 
with such leniency." See Gurr, 904 P.2d at 244. One of the reasons for 
Appellant's supplemental 402 motion was to seek a corresponding reduced 
sentence so that he is allowed him to remain in the United States and not be 
deported. Furthermore, the State prosecutor and Judge Heffernan already have 
recognized that Appellant did not deserve a felony conviction and had reduced 
such to a misdemeanor. See R.58. It would indeed be contrary to the interests of 
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justice and unduly harsh to subject him to the penalty of deportation when his 
conviction was for a class A misdemeanor and which only allows a sentence of 
365 days or less. See U.C.A. § 76-3-204. 
B. Utah Code Section 76-3-402 Should be Read as a Whole Because Each 
Subsection Simply Helps Define how the Statute Should be Applied and the 
Subsections do not Act Independently. 
"A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that 'the terms of 
related code provisions should be construed in a harmonious fashion.'" Bagshaw, 
836 P.3d 1384 (quoting Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 
(Utah 1989).2 Courts should "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and 
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592. 
The district court erroneously concluded that Section 402 subsections (1) 
and (2) have "separate and unique" impacts by relying on a footnote in the United 
2
 See generally Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, f 16, 158 P.3d 540 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) ("When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to 
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature"); State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 
UT 49, If 15, 147 P.3d 1176 ("Our objective in interpreting a court rule is to give 
effect to the intent of the body that promulgated it"); See also Anderson v. Bell, 
2010 UT 47,19, 234 P.3d 1147 ("It is axiomatic that the best evidence of 
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself. But our plain language 
analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into individual words and 
subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that each part or 
section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce 
a harmonious whole.") (internal quotations and citations omitted)(emphasis in 
original). 
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States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's decision in Cruz-Garza v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2005), and thereby denying Appellant a 
corresponding reduction of sentence. See R. 63; Addendum A at 2. In Cruz-
Garza, the Tenth Circuit Court noted that Section 402(2) "deals specifically with 
probation compliance and does not involve any consideration of the offense and 
offender characteristics that govern the reduction of offense." Cruz-Garza, 396 
F.3d at 1132 n.5. However, neither Cruz-Garza nor Section 402(2)prohibit a 
court from reducing a sentence along with a reduction of offense; rather Section 
402(2) simply clarifies that the offense may be reduced for other reasons in 
addition to consideration of the "offense and offender characteristics." Id. 
An analysis of the statute itself reveals that a reduced sentence is available 
when there is a reduced degree of offense. Section 402(2)(e) specifically allows a 
reduction of offense in "in the interest of justice." This phrase further corresponds 
with Section 402(1), which explains that the district court may reduce the degree of 
the offense if it would be "unduly harsh" to impose the original conviction. See 
Section 76-3-402(1). 
Ironically, unlike here, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Cruz-Garza specifically 
found Section 402 to be an "ameliorative" statute which aided in preventing Mr. 
Cruz Garza's deportation. There, the Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's 
alteration of the defendant's conviction where it ordered "judgment and sentence 
be entered accordingly." Cruz-Garza, 396 F. 3d at 1128. On the other hand, Judge 
Hyde employed here this "ameliorative" law to aid and expedite Appellant's 
deportation. 
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The district court also erred by relying on Section 402(6) to conclude that it 
lacked authority to "change the underlying sentence" because Section 402(6) 
prohibits a modification of the actual title of the original charge. See R. 63; 
Addendum A at 2. The district court's reliance on subsection 402(6) is clearly 
misplaced and a red herring. The plain meaning of Section 402(6) only refers to 
the actual title of the charged offense and says nothing about modification of a 
sentence. See Utah Code Ann. 76-6-402(6). Here, Appellant did not seek to 
change the title of the offense for which he was convicted. See R.57, 59. The title 
of his conviction was theft and it remained so. Rather, even in light of the Padilla 
violation recognized by the State, Appellant only modestly sought a corresponding 
reduction of his sentence pursuant to Section 76-3-204. See R.59 at 2 (citing to 
Section 76-3-402 and Padilla). 
Appellant's argument that Section 402 is meant to be read as a whole is 
further buttressed by this Court's and Utah Supreme Court's precedents in State v. 
Bagshaw 836 P.3d 1384 (holding that the lower court erred when it applied Section 
76-3-402 "in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of Section 76-3-
104(2)"), and State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,146 (reading Section 76-3-203.1 in 
conjunction with Section 76-3-402 to conclude that the removal of an enhancement 
is the equivalent of a one-degree reduction of the charged offense). Bagshaw and 
Barrett are discussed here in detail. 
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In Bagshaw, the defendant sought a reduction of two felony convictions to 
class B misdemeanors after the termination of her probation. Bagshaw, 836 P.3d 
at 1385. In interpreting the 1990 version of Section 402, this Court noted that 
companion code sections should be read and understood together. The Court 
followed Finlinson, 782 P.2d at 471-72, explaining that "[a] fundamental principle 
of statutory construction is that "the terms of related code provisions should be 
construed in a harmonious fashion." Bagshaw, 836 P.3d at 1385 (reading Utah 
Code Sections 76-3-104(2) and 76-3-402(2)(b) together and concluding that the 
lack of specificity regarding the category of misdemeanor in Section 76-3-402(2) 
mandates a reduction of defendant's two felony convictions to class B rather than 
class A misdemeanors). 
Bagshaw therefore stands for the proposition that Section 402 is not to be 
read in isolation but in conjunction with other companion code sections. See id. 
Here, the relative companion code, section 76-3-204, specifically says that the 
punishment for a class A misdemeanor is "for a term not exceeding one year." 
UCA § 76-3-204(1). To accept Judge Hyde's interpretation of section 76-3-402 as 
prohibiting a corresponding reduction of sentence under section 76-3-204 is to 
impermissibly render the latter superfluous. See generally State v. Maestas, 2002 
UT 123, Tf 53, 63 P.3d 621(quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 46:06 (4th ed.1984) (emphasis added) ("As is the case in construing 
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statutes, this court's rules of practice and procedure require close attention to their 
exact language. 'It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, 
if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute .... No clause [J 
sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the 
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of 
the statute"'). 
Accordingly, as in Bagshaw, when read in consonant with each other, 
sections 76-3-402 and 76-3-204 support Appellant's position that the district court 
had the authority to modify the sentence accompanying the already reduced degree 
of conviction. Therefore the district court's conclusion was not supported by 
subsection (402)(6) and had no basis in Utah appellate court precedents. 
In Barrett, the defendants received a lesser sentence in conjunction with a 
reduced conviction. See Barrett 2005 UT at |46. The Supreme Court understood 
that a reduction of degree or enhancement results in the "accompanying" reduction 
of sentence. See id. at f46 ("Under the proper interpretation of the relevant 
statutes, the defendant's offense should have been reduced to simple first degree 
felonies with accompanying prison terms of five years to life") (the original 
sentence was for an enhanced prison term of nine years to life). However, the 
issue in Barrett was not regarding the fact that the defendants received a lesser 
sentence, but rather whether it was permissible for the court to reduce a conviction 
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by one degree and additionally reduce the statutory enhancement without 
prosecutor's consent. The Court held that a reduction of a conviction by one 
degree in addition to the elimination of a statutory "enhancement" is equivalent to 
a reduction of two degrees which is not allowed by Section 402 without the 
prosecutor's consent. Id. at f 1. In other words, the defendants were not allowed 
to "double dip" into the statutory scheme by achieving the equivalent of a two-step 
reduction in sentence (what really matters) without the consent of the state. 
Critical to the Court's determination in Barrett was that the statutory 
enhancement scheme directly affects the penalty (sentence) attached to the 
conviction. In fact it is referred to as an "enhanced penalty." See Barrett 2005 UT 
88 at p 2 . An enhancement is considered a "degree" of offense for purposes of § 
402. See Barrett 2005 UT at ^47. Thus, the logical corollary is that a reduction in 
the degree of a conviction (or enhancement) is directly attached to the sentence (or 
penalty) that the defendant should receive. "[I]t is undisputed that the net effect of 
a one-degree reduction for sentencing purposes is the imposition of the sentence 
appropriate for the underlying crime." Id. at f 39. While discussing a related 
statute, 76-3-203.1, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "the Legislature did not 
intend to place defendants" who are convicted of different degrees or 
enhancements "on equal footing." Id. Because an enhanced sentence is the 
equivalent of a next higher degree of offense, a reduction to a next lower degree of 
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offense should correspond to a reduction of the attached penalty or sentence. The 
fact that Section 402's purpose is to ameliorate the harshness of the conviction 
when a defendant is undeserving of the penalty demonstrates that the Legislature 
did not intend for defendants who were worthy to receive a reduction of conviction 
to be on equal footing with those who deserved a conviction of the higher degree. 
Thus defendants with different levels of conviction should also receive different 
levels of punishment. 
Further, in 2007, § 76-3-402 was amended to codify the Court's holding in 
Barrett and to clarify that a reduction of enhancement is the equivalent of a 
reduction in degree.4 See UCA § 76-3-402(8). By defining what the "next lower 
degree of offense" includes, "[a]s used in this section," Section 402(8) inextricably 
ties the entire section 402 statutory scheme together and clarifies that the definition 
runs throughout the entire section and relates to any charge that increase the 
sentence. See § 76-3-402(8). Indeed the phrase "lower degree of offense" is 
scattered throughout the statute a total of five times. See 76-3-402(1), (2), (2)(e),(5) 
and (6). Therefore, the reduction in enhancement also results in the reduction of the 
penalty associated with the enhancement and it follows that the resulting sentence 
will have to be reduced also. 
4
 Since section 402(8) is essentially a codification of the holding in Barrett, a 
detailed analysis of that case is critical. 
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Barrett also suggests that it is the sentence associated with the reduction of 
degree of crime that matters to a defendant. See Barrett 2005 UT 88, ^ [46. As 
manifested by Barrett and 402(8), the allowance of a sentence reduction is critical 
and applies to the entire statutory scheme. To put it bluntly, if there were no 
corresponding reduction in sentence under section 76-3-402, then there is virtually 
no need for section 402, period. 
Thus, to interpret Section 402(2) as Judge Hyde did in allowing a reduction 
in the degree of an offense but not the attendant sentence would be incompatible 
with the plain meaning of the statute, would only render superfluous, if not, 
moribund section 76-3-402, and would also clearly render superfluous sections 76-
3-104 and 76-3-204. It would also render superfluous the holding in Barrett and 
the subsequent codification of that case in § 76-3-402(8). 
Moreover, adopting Judge Hyde's flawed interpretation of section 76-3-
402(2) would resurrect the position rejected by the Barrett court. Specifically, the 
defendants in Barrett failed to recognize that it is precisely a change in an 
offense's degree that ultimately results in the increase (or decrease) of the 
sentence. See Barrett 2005 UT 88, ^ [36. Judge Hyde commits the same error by 
concluding that section 76-3-402(2) functions solely to change the degree of the 
offense but leaves "all other attributes" including the sentence unchanged. 
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Appellant notes that this Court has already determined that "[t]he language 
of section 76-3-104(2) is clear and unambiguous." Bagshaw, 836 P.3d at 1386. 
Section 104(2) does not prohibit a district court from reducing a sentence in 
conjunction with a modification of degree of conviction. Construed in a 
"harmonious fashion" with other Utah law, this Court should conclude that a 
reduced sentence naturally follows a reduced degree of conviction under sections 
76-3-104, 204 and 402. 
In sum, Section 402 should be read as a whole. Although 402(2) deals 
specifically with probation compliance, it should still be read with the entire 
statutory scheme which has the purpose of ameliorating the harshness of a 
conviction and thus allows for fairness to govern the conviction and corresponding 
sentence when the results would be unduly harsh. See U.C.A. §76-3-402; Cruz-
Garza, 396 F.3d 1125. Accordingly, whether the degree of a conviction is reduced 
based on "offender characteristics" under Section 402(1), or via "probation 
compliance" under Section 402(2), has no bearing on whether or not to 
correspondingly reduce the sentence in conjunction with the reduced conviction, 
particularly given the import of sections 76-3-104 and 76-3-204, which specified 
the maximum sentences allowed for various designated misdemeanor convictions. 
See UCA §§76-3-104; 76-3-204. 
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Thus, the district court's reliance on Cruz-Garza for the proposition that 
subsections (1) and (2) of section 76-3-402 are to be read separately or in isolation 
from other Utah statutes - such as 76-3-104 and 76-3-204 - was misplaced and fails 
in the face of well-established principles of statutory construction. This is 
especially so given that Cruz-Garza itself was itself a deportation case in which the 
Tenth Circuit employed section 76-3-402 to ameliorate and temper the impact of a 
guilty plea vis-a-vis the Government's attempt to effectuate the removal of a lawful 
permanent resident as an "aggravated felon." See Cruz-Garza, 396 F.3d at 1131-
32 (holding that the Government failed to prove that the petitioner was convicted 
of an aggravated felony when his conviction was reduced in the interest of justice 
pursuant to section 76-3-402 because his original felony conviction would have 
been unduly harsh). Therefore, neither the holding of Cruz-Garza nor the tenor of 
the decision supports Judge Hyde's harsh and erroneous application of section 76-
3-402 and Cruz-Garza. 
C. The District Court's Interpretation of Section 76-3-402 Frustrates the 
Legislature's Intended Goals of Rehabilitating Defendants by Incentivizing them to 
Complete Probation. 
When interpreting statutes, this Court first looks to the plain language. 
Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 UT 102, f 18, 104 P.3d 1242. "We presume that 
the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to 
its ordinary and accepted meaning." C. T. ex rel Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f^ 
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9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other interpretive tools are not 
needed in analyzing the statute when the language of the statute is plain. Adams v. 
Swensen, 2005 UT 8,18, 108 P.3d 725. See also Bagshaw, 836 P.3d 1384 
(quoting Finlinson, 782 P.2d at 471-72); Barrett 2005 UT 88, f 39 (considering 
legislative history and "the general manner in which the statute operates"). 
At issue here is whether section 76-3-402(2) allows for a reduced sentence 
in conjunction with a reduced conviction. The language of the statute is plain, and 
nothing in it indicates that section 402(2) prohibits a judge from reducing a 
sentence along with a conviction. Furthermore, read as a whole, the statue allows 
for a reduced sentence when there is a reduced conviction. See UCA § 76-3-
402(1) ("the court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly"). 
But, even if this Court finds section 402 to be ambiguous, the Court should 
"seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations." 
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^ 7, 31 P.3d 528, superseded on other grounds by 
statute U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b)(2008). In 2007, the Utah legislature amended 
section 402 after unanimously approving House Bill 85 entitled "Sentence 
Reduction Clarification." The legislative history with respect to the passage of the 
Sentence Reduction Clarification bill clears up any doubt as to the legislative intent 
and purpose of the statute and leaves no room for ambiguity. During the Senate 
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floor debates, Senator Bell explained that Section 402(2) allows a reduction of 
sentence even after probation, ".. .where the terms of probation would be 
performed first, then upon successful completion of that, a discharge from the 
probation, the defendant could ask for reduction of sentence subject to notice to the 
victim and participation by the victim in the consideration of the penalty. So that 
clarifies what is already existing law." See HB0085, 2007 General Legislative 
Session, Senate Floor debate audio, February 8, 2007 at 0:17 - 1:11 (emphasis 
added), found at 
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2007GS&Day=0&Bill=HB0085&Hou 
se=S. 
Further, Appellant notes that the title of section 76-3-402 is "Conviction of 
lower degree of offense ~ Procedure and limitations." However, this Court has 
previously referred to §402 as the "Sentence Reduction Statute," Gurr, 904 P.2d at 
243 n.2 (referring to Section 402 as the "sentence reduction statute"). This Court 
has previously held that "Section 76-3-402 permits a court to impose sentence for 
the next lower classification of the offense." Gurr, 904 P.2d at 244. 
As cases such as Barrett and the legislative history reflect, it is the sentence 
associated with the reduction of degree of crime that matters to a defendant, not the 
statutory categorization of the crime itself. See Barrett 2005 UT 88, f 46. The so-
called "reduction" of an offense becomes meaningless if the sentence stays the 
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same. To permit such a result would destroy the intended result of the legislature: 
to rehabilitate defendants by giving them an incentive to successfully complete 
probation. Indeed, a reduction pursuant to section 402(2) is only achievable after a 
defendant successfully completes probation. In other words, if successfully 
completing probation under 402(2) does not result in a reduced sentence, then the 
carrot is removed from the stick. 
Thus the district court erred in finding that Section 76-3-402(2) does not 
permit a reduction of sentence after a reduction in the degree of conviction. Even 
if there is any ambiguity in the statute via section 402(2), the legislative history of 
the 2007 amendments removes any such ambiguity. Section 402 dictates that a 
reduction of the degree of conviction is supposed to go hand in hand with a 
corresponding reduction of sentence. 
D. Imposing a Sentence of up to Five Years in Prison is not Permitted for a Class 
A Misdemeanor Conviction and Therefore Judge Hyde's Imposition of Such 
Sentence Constitutes an Illegal Sentence. 
In denying the parties' stipulated motion, Judge Hyde held: "The court 
concludes that the only attribute of a judgment which may be modified pursuant to 
Section 76-3-402(2) is the degree of the offense charged. Other attributes of the 
judgment, including its title and the original sentence flowing from the judgment, 
remain unchanged." See R. 63, at p. 2; see also Add A. However, as noted above, 
section 76-3-204(1) specifically and unambiguously provides that "[a] person who 
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has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment as 
follows: (1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one 
year." (emphasis added). See also Saxton, 519 P.2d at 1342 (stating that the 
penalty for a class A misdemeanor is fixed at no more than one year in prison). 
Therefore, Judge Hyde's conclusion that the "other attributes" of Appellant's 
judgment remain unchanged flies in the face of the plain language in section 76-3-
204. The statute is so plain and clear ~ an individual with a misdemeanor 
conviction may not be sentenced to a term that exceeds one year. Id. 
In Barrett, the defendant argued that the penalty for an enhanced second 
degree felony is the same penalty applicable to a first degree felony. The Utah 
Supreme Court disagreed., "[A]n elevation of the degree of the charged offense... 
ultimately results in an increased sentence." Barrett, 2005 UT 88 at p 6 . The 
Court noted that the district court exercised its discretion to lower the degree of the 
offense and relied on the sentencing term applicable to the lesser degree charge, 
and then reduced the sentence accordingly. See id. at Tj 33. 
Since an enhanced penalty and or a next degree of conviction carries with it 
an increase in prison term, see id. at f 37, then it is axiomatic that a reduction in 
penalty or degree of charge carries with it a decrease in the prison term. Similarly 
in Bagshaw, this Court found that the defendant's two felony convictions should be 
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reduced to class B misdemeanors rather than class A because "a consonant 
interpretation of the two statutes" so requires. Bagshaw 836 P.2d at 1386. 
Here, accordingly, it would be fundamentally unfair and illegal to convict a 
defendant with a misdemeanor and yet sentence him to the harsher penalty of a 
felony when he is undeserving of that kind of conviction. Therefore this Court 
should conclude that Appellant's current sentence of up to five years as envisaged 
by Judge's Hyde's decision is unduly harsh, unfair and clearly illegal, since he has 
only been convicted of a class A misdemeanor and should not be sentenced to a 
prison term "not exceeding one year." See U.C.A. 76-3-204. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE 
RULE OF LENITY TO FIND THAT THE AMELIORATIVE NATURE OF 
SECTION 402 REQUIRES A MOTION TO CLARIFY JUDGMENT BE 
GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, PARTICULARLY WHERE 
THE PARTIES STIPULATED TO THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH 
REDUCTION. 
A subsumed or corollary issue in this case is whether the district court 
should also have applied the rule of lenity to find that the ameliorative nature of 
Section 402 required that the parties' stipulated motion to clarify judgment and to 
reduce the corresponding sentence imposed on the reduced conviction be granted 
in the interest of justice. 
In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the 
ambiguity in favor of the defendant. See e.g., United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 
476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407 (1917); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 519, 128 S. 
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Ct. 2020, 2028 (2008) ("We interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of 
defendants, not prosecutors"); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 
99 L.Ed. 905 (1955) ("When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing 
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of 
lenity"). This Court has also recognized that "a guilty defendant who is considered 
worthy of reduced sentence should receive all the advantages that go with such 
leniency." State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d at 244, quoting State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 
64 (Utah App.), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Here, section 402 is not ambiguous, but even if it were, Appellant would be 
deserving of the lesser punishment attendant to a class A misdemeanor in 
accordance with the rule of lenity. After entering the guilty plea, Appellant 
became aware that he had not been advised of the immigration consequences of his 
plea, which in turn amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation of effective 
assistance of counsel. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. 1473. Appellant appeared pro se 
before the district court in 2010 and asked for a reduction of his conviction. After 
a hearing, the district court granted a reduction from a third degree felony to a class 
A misdemeanor, pursuant to § 76-3-402(2). See R. 54-58. By mere oversight, and 
presumably because Appellant appeared pro se, Judge Heffernan did not reduce 
the corresponding sentence of felony to misdemeanor. However, even the State 
recognized that a sentence of up to five years would not be in the interest of justice 
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when Appellant was only deserving of a class A misdemeanor conviction and 
where his conviction may have been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights as recognized by Padilla, and therefore readily stipulated to a reduction of 
the sentence. See R.59. This is tantamount to a confession of error,5 a laudable 
goal for good law enforcement. See Young v. U.S, 315 U.S. 257,259, 62 S.Ct. 510 
(1942) ("The public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the 
Government requires that they be quick to confess error when, in their opinion, a 
miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent"). Notwithstanding 
the State's confession, Judge Hyde opined that section 76-3-402(2) does not allow 
a reduction of sentence when there is a reduction of degree of offense. R. 63. 
Axiomatically, stipulation by the parties in a criminal case is entitled to 
deference by the courts. Courts have 'recognized that a stipulation of facts by the 
parties in a criminal case' can be relied on by the District Court without affecting 
the jurisdiction for an appeal. See United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277, 72 S.Ct. 
275 (1952), and United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 81 S.Ct. 547 (1961). In 
fact, jury instructions routinely provide that "[w]hen the attorneys on both sides 
stipulate or agree as to the existence of a fact, you may accept the stipulation as 
evidence and regard that fact as proved..." 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff, & 
5
 See,e.g., State v. Basford, 799 P.2d 228, 230 n.l (Utah App. 1990) ("accepting] 
the state's confession of error," where the state agreed that Mr. Basford was 
incorrectly convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle, as he lacked the required 
intent). 
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K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 12.03, p. 333 (4th ed.1992). 
Given the State's confession of error on the substantive law with respect to Padilla 
violation, and particularly given the parties' stipulation that Appellant's sentence 
be reduced to 360 days ~ which is clearly in comport with Section 76-3-204(1) 
providing that a sentence for a class A misdemeanor not exceed one year ~ the 
district court should have allowed the reduction of sentence, and in the case of any 
doubt or confusion as to whether or not 76-3-402 allowed a reduction of sentence, 
the court should have applied the rule of lenity and resolved the ambiguity in favor 
of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant urges this Court to find that the district 
court erred as a matter of law and abused discretion by refusing to grant a reduced 
sentence in conjunction with the granting of a reduced degree of conviction 
pursuant to sections 76-3-204 and 76-3-402. The Court should also find that the 
district court erred in refusing to give deference to parties' stipulated motion to 
clarify judgment, particularly given the State's confession of error. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's decision, remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion, and order that Judge 
Hyde honor the parties' stipulation that Appellant's sentence be reduced to 360 
days in jail, pursuant to sections 76-3-204 and 76-3-402. 
33 
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HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAMIROJROSEGURA, 
Defendant. 
•• • • • ^ — — — ^ « — ' ' • • •• ' • I" • ' " ' ' ' ' • ' " — 
| MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
| Case Number: 011905347 
j Judge Noel S. Hyde 
The matter before the court is the Stipulated Emergency Motion to Clarify Judgment on 
402 Motion filed herein on January 31,2011. The motion was filed jointly by the State of Utah 
and Defendant, and seeks to clarify the court's order of March 12,2010, by supplementing the 
minute entry relating to such order to include a fiirther provision that the Defendant's sentence in 
this case be for a term of imprisonment of 360 days. The court has fully reviewed the pending 
motion, together with all relevant documents and information in the court's file and has 
determined that oral argument of this matter is not necessary. 
Resolution of the present motion requires a review and interpretation of the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402, and particularly subsections (1) and (2) of such section. The motion 
which provided the basis of the court's order of March 12, 2010, was brought pursuant to § 76-3-
402(2), which authorizes the court to "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense" upon a defendant's successful completion of the terms of court-ordered probation. 
Significantly, this opportunity for a defendant to have a judgment entered for the "next lower 
degree of offense" occurs only after probation has been successfully completed, at which time the 
court is without jurisdiction to impose any further sentence in the case. Also, the express 
language of subsection (2) contains no reference to the sentence originally imposed in the case, 
or to any modification thereof. 
The statutory language cited in the motion now before die court in support of the 
suggestion that the court has authority to modify the sentence previously imposed is language 
found in § 76-3-402(1). This subsection, however, addresses the circumstances and 
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considerations to be applied by the court at the time of the original sentencing. The authorization 
given to the court to "enter a judgment of ^pnviction for the next lower degree of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly" provides sufficient latitude to allow the court, at the time of the 
original sentencing, to conform the sentence to the reduced level of offense, upon the court's 
determination that such reduction in the level of offense is appropriate. Nothing in § 76-3-402(1) 
requires, or even authorizes, the court to modify a sentence in connection with a motion brought 
under § 76-3-402(2). The separate and unique impacts of subsections (1) and (2) of Utah Code 
Ann.§76-3-402 are confirmed by the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
in Cruz-Garciav.Ashcraft. 896 F.3d 1125 (10'h Cir. 2005). 
The court's conclusion that the relief available to a defendant pursuant to a motion 
brought under § 76-3-402(2) does not authorize a change in the underlying sentence is further 
supported by Section 76-3-402(6), which subsection expressly prohibits even a modification of 
the actual title of the offense originally charged. Therefore, the court concludes that the only 
attribute of a judgment which may be modified pursuant to Section 76-3-402(2) is the degree of 
the offense charged. Other attributes of the judgment, including it's title and the original sentence 
flowing from the judgment, remain unchanged. 
Based upon the court's foregoing analysis of the Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402, the motion 
now before the court is hereby denied. This memorandum decision and order shall constitute the 
final order of the court in this matter, and no additional documentation of the order is required. 
Dated this H day of March, 2011. 
By the Court: 
NOELS. HYDE 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum . 
Decision and Order, first class mail and postage prepaid, to the following parties this / l i a y 
of March, 2011. 
Hakeem Ishola, Esq. 
Aaron Tarin, Esq. 
1750 West Research Way, Ste 204 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Christopher Shaw, Esq. 
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Addendum B 
Hakeem Ishola, #5970 
Aaron Tarin # 12258 
ISHOLA TARIN,PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1750 West Research Way, Suite 204 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 886-0500 
Facsimile: (801) 908-0500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, OGDEN COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) STIPULATED EMERGENCY 
I MOTION TO CLARIFY JUDGMENT 
) ON 402 MOTION 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
No. 011905347 
Defendant. ) 
RAMIROJROSEGl 
/ Judge ^ 
Plaintiff, by its counsd <'lnis Sluiv , 
Aaron Tarin, hereby file the following Stipulated Emergency Motion to Clarify Judgment on 402 
riiuii id |n.rsuajil U'1'lJi i uk Viu• ' ;fi I 'llf.1, Kuk i^ili I'i.• h kuh , ul t \\\I Procedure, and 
Rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This motion is based on the following: 
RELEVANT FACTS & COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged in this Court on November T:1 I' o], with Theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah ( ink' Ann Sci (inn 'n 6 101 i ll Defendant was 
found guilty by the Court and sentenced accordingly. 
I our) haw; limp, iciogru/cd Liu: Minstilulion.il n^lil ,i nun i ili/i n hi In iJcquad jduce 
on the collateral immigration consequences of a guilty plea. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 
_ U S _ , 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010); Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86,125 P.3d 930. After becoming 
aware that he was not advised of certain collateral consequences of the plea at the time he 
entered into it, Defendant appeared pro se before this Court earlier in 2010 and sought a 
reduction of his conviction by one degree pursuant to § 76-3-402. On March 12,2010, this 
Court granted Defendant's 402 motion and ordered that the "severity [of the conviction be] 
decreased from 3rd Felony to Class A Misdemeanor." See Minutes 404 Motion. 
Section 76-3-402 provides in pertinent parts: 
(1) If. . . the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, and after having given any victim . . . and the prosecuting attorney an 
opportunity to be heard, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may 
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
In the instant case, this Court reduced Defendant's degree of conviction, but by mere 
oversight (and primarily because Defendant appeared pro se), the Court failed to "impose 
sentence accordingly." Rule 52(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 30, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure both combine to authorize the Court to correct and amend the record and 
relevant findings made by the Court. See Rule 52(d), Utah R. Civ. P.; Rule 30, Utah R. Crim. P. 
Accordingly, the parties agree that the Court should clarify its minute entry on the 402 motion 
and impose on Defendant a sentence of 360 days.1 
1
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(1) ("A person who has been convicted of a [Class A] 
misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment. .. for a term not exceeding one year. "). ; 
2 
STIPULATION 
The State of Utah, by and through its attorney, Chris Shaw, hereby stipulates to 
Dated this / / day of January, 2011. 
Attorney's Office 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respect! till) asks this Cour t to grant this emergency motion to 
clarify judgment and impose a corresponding sentence of 360 days for his misdemeanor 
conviction, nunc pro tunc. 
RESPRTHU I Y SIIKMMTHMln*
 m //~_dzy oi Jaiiuui) '(111 
AARON T/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have hand-delivered or sent via first class mail, postage-prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATED EMERGENCY MOTION TO 
CLARIFY JUDGMENT AND TO REDUCE DEGREE OF CONVICTION AND 
PROPOSED ORDER, this 12th day of January, 2011, to the following: 
Chris Shaw 
Weber County Attorney's Office 
2380 Washington Blvd, Suite 230 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Amend.... 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. Vl-Jury Trials 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
Currentness 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Notes of Decisions (4764) 
Current through P.L. 112-17 approved 6-1-11 
1.IHI of Document s': 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works 
Westlaw, 
U . C . A . I *>S1 § 7 6 - , V I I ) 4 
C 
West's I Jtah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Tl Chapter 3. Punishments (Rets & Annos) 
*M Part 1. Classification of Offenses 
•» § 76-3-104. Misdemeanors classified 
leanoi s are classified ii ito three categoi ie s: 
(a; class A misdemeanors; 
(b) Class B
 m j S ( j e r r i e a n o r s ; 
(c) Class C misdemeanors. 
(2) An offense designated a .misdemeanor, either in this code or in another lam withe i it specification as to pi inishment 
or category, is a class B misdemeanor. 
CREDIT! S) 
I ,awsl973,c. 196., § 76-3-104. 
, , r e r , UirOIJoh 2010 General Session, including results from 1:1 ie N i\ embei 2010 General Electioi i 
Reuters 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 201 i I homsori Reuters. No Claim to Orig, I IS G< > Vi "< i r k s . 
Westlaw 
U.CA. 1953 § 76-3-204 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*M Chapter 3. Punishments (Refs & Annos) 
*H Part 2. Sentencing 
-» § 76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction-Term of imprisonment 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 90 days. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-204. 
Current through 2010 General Session, including results from the November 2010 General Election. 
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters 
END OF DOCUMENT 
a ^ n i i TK/xmcnn OiantArc >Jo r i a i m tn Drier IJS Gov. Works. 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map ) Calendar | Code/Constitutioi 111 louse 1 Senate ) Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: 1 G o T o ! 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal i ^ 
Chapter 3 Punishments 
Section 402 Conviction, • >. 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure and limitations. 
(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of whicl \ 
the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, and after having given any 
victims present at the sentencing and the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be 
unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may 
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendai it on probation, whether or not 
the defendant is committed to jail as a condition iAprobation, the court may enter a judgment of conviction, for 
the next lower degree of offense: I 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation; 
(b) upon motion hri notice to the prosecutingkttorney; 
(c) after reasona§l\effort has been made by tile prosecuting attorney to p. >; 
(d) after a hearing iXrequested by either partyfcmder Subsection (2)(c); and 
(e) if the court ftndsVitering a judgment of cinviction for tl le next lower degree of offense is ii 1 the interest of 
justice. \ I 
(3) (a) An offense may\e reduced only one degree under this section, whether the reduction is entered under 
Subsection (1) or (2), unles\the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degreesX I 
(b) In no case may an offence be reduced unler this section b> 1 1 101 e tl tai 1 tv 0 degrees 
(4) This section does not preclude any persofc from obtaining or being gi ai ite i ai 1 expi mgement of his record 
as provided by law. \ I 
(5) The court may not enter judgment for a Jonvictioi it foi 1 low ei clegi ee of : ffei use if: 
(a) the reduction is specifically Vecluded by law; or 
(b) if any unpaid balance remainVon court Jrdered restitution for the offense for which the reduction is sought. 
(6) When the court enters judgmeM for a lolver degree of offense under this section, the actual title of the 
offense for which the reduction is macro may npt be altered. 
(7) (a) A person may not obtain a requctioij under this section of a convictioi 1 that requires the person to 
register as a sex offender until the regist\tionlrequirements under Section 77-27-21.5 have expired. 
(b) A person required to register as a S8K offender for the person's lifetime under Subsection 77-27-21.5( 12)(c) 
may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for the offense or offenses that require the person to register as a 
sex offender. \ ' 
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense"'1 includes an offense regarding which: 
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would increase either the 
maximum or the minimum sentence; and 
(b) the court removes the statutory enl uaii t ce i 1: leu it p i in si iiai it t ::> tl lis se :±i/ : ii 1 . 
Amended by Chapter 103, 2007 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76 0-- imLi't-./ii ; ' tes 
« Previous Section (76-3-401) Next Section (76-3-403) »> 
Questioi is/Con imer its | Utal 1 State Home Page | I erms of Use/Privacy Policy | ADA Notice 
Addendum D 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security NotJC€ to A p p e a r 
In removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act: 
Subject ID : 285733297 FIN #: 1096170122 Filf No- A 0 9 0 3 2 2 6 1 4 
DOB: 11/09/1972 Event No: SLC1009000154 
!n the Mattcrol :  
Rantlxo OSEGUERA Ga rc i a AKA: OSEGIJERA , RAMIRO - ORRCTT*!R?. JR., 
Respondent: __ RAMIIRO ; _ _ >- —. currently residing at: 
I F X-E CTJS7om S212 S 0 U T H coLLEQB DRIVE, STE 100 , SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8412 3 
(Number, street, city and, ZIP code*) (Area code and .phone m imbcr) 
[ j I You are an arriving alien ,:, , 
[71 2. You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled. 
H 3. You have been admitted to the I Inited States, bin are removable for the reasons stated below,,. 
'he Department of Homeland Sccui ity alleges thai you: 
1. You are not a citizen or national of the United States; 
2. You are a native of MEXICO and a citizen of MEXICO; 
3 You entered the United States at an unknown location on or about an unknown date 
4. Your status was adjusted to that of lawful, permanent resident on 01/.09/1989 under 
section 245 of the Act; 
5. You were, on 01/22/2002, convicted in the Second District Court at Ogden, XJT for the 
offense of Theft,a Third Degree Felony,in violation of 76-6-404 of the .Utah Code, 
annotated, for which you were sentenced to an indeterminate term, of not. to exceed, five 
fears in the Utah State Prison. Case Noo. 011905347. Based upon a, Mot3 on of defendant, 
conviction reduced to Class A Misdemeanor on 03/09/2010. 
Admitted denied the rest 
R the basis of the foregoing,, ii is charged that you arc subject u> remo\ J ""on1 ,,|f' ' ' ,h,d Mali1 pi1 vim1 'h" " " " • uij" 
'ovision(s) of law: 
ection 237 (a) (2) (A) (lii ) : >f tl i,e Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), as amended, in 
hat, at any time after , • , 2nd ssi on, you, have been convicted of an aggravated felony as 
efined in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, a law relating to a theft offense (including 
eceipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment at 
east 1 year was imposed 
P 3ad i « fiti I ! Ill I dqmenl r r • IIif- fljiw fell 
Denied 
J 'I his notice i > being issued afte: m i asylum of i icer has found that, the respondent has demonstrated a credible fear of"persecution 
or torture. 
3 Section 235(b)( 1) order was vacated pursuant to: .QgCPR 208.30(0(2) QsCFR 235.3(b)(5)(iv) 
I' ^Ri; ORDLRliD to appear before an immigration judge of the United States Department of Justice at: 
100 W. AMKLIA EARHART DR 160 Salt Lake City UTAH US 84116 
(Complete Address of immigration Court, including Room Numbei „ ij any) 
i i ! ! l i ! i i ! ^ at * t i m e t o b e a e t to show why you shou%l not be removed from, the United States based on the 
{Dale) (Time) [%•' 
,n w , , , r ,. , ROBERT CORDERO > \ \ oDDG 
•ge(s) sci forth above. ^ \ \ j ^UU{*> 
(Signature and Title of Issuing Officer) 
:: September 29, ,2 0,10 s*it L*k« city, m 
(City and State) 
See reverse for important information 
Notice to Respondent 
Warning: Any statement you make nwy be used against you in removal proceedings. 
Alien Registration: This copy of the Notice to Appear served upon you is evidence of your alien registration while you are under removal 
proceedings. You are required to carry it with you at ail times. 
Representation: If you so choose, you may be represented in this proceeding, at no expense to the Government, by an attorney or other individual 
authorized and qualified lo represent persons before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, pursuant to 8 CFR 3.16. Unless you so request, no 
hearing will be scheduled earlier than ten days from the date of this notice, to allow you sufficient time to secure counsel. A list of qualified attorneys 
and organizations who may be available to represent you at no cost will be provided with this notice. 
Conduct of the hearing: At the time of your hearing, you should bring with you any affidavits or other documents, which you desire to have 
considered in connection with your case. If you wish to have the testimony of any witnesses considered, you should arrange to have such witnesses 
present at the hearing. 
At your hearing you will be given the opportunity to admit or deny any or all of the allegations in the Notice to Appear and that you arc inadmissible 
or removable on the charges contained in the Notice to Appear. You will have an opportunity to present evidence on your own behalf, to examine any 
evidence presented by the Government, to object, on proper legal grounds, to the receipt of evidence and to cross examine any witnesses presented by 
the Government. At the conclusion of your hearing, you have a right to appeal an adverse decision by the immigration judge. 
You will be advised by the immigration judge before whom you appear of any relief from removal for which you may appear eligible including the 
privilege of departure voluntarily. You will be given a reasonable opportunity to make any such application to the immigration judge. 
Failure to appear: You arc required to provide the DHS, in writing, with your full mailing address and teleplrcne number. You must notify the 
Immigration Court immediately by using Fonn EOIR-33 whenever you change your address or teleplwne number during the course of this preceoding. 
You will be provided with a copy of this fonn. Notices of hearing will be mailed to this address. If you do not submit Fonn EOIR-33 and do not 
otherwise provide an address at which you may be reached during proceedings, then the Government shall not be required lo provide you with written 
notice of your hearing. If you fail to attend the hearing at the lime and place designated on this notice, or any date and time later directed by the 
Immigration Court, a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in your absence, and you may be arrested and detained by the DHS. 
Mandatory Duty to Surrender for Removal: If you become subject to a final order of removal, you must surrender for removal to one of the 
offices listed in N CFR 241.16(a). Specific addresses on locations for surrender can be obtained from your local DHS office or over the internet at 
htto://www.ice.i!ov/about/dro/contact.htm. You must surrender within 30 days from the date the order becomes administratively final, unless you 
obtain an order from a Federal court, immigration court, or the Board of Immigration Appeals staying execution of the removal order. Immigration 
regulations at 8 CFR 241.1 define when the removal order becomes administratively final. If you are granted voluntary departure and fail to depart 
the United States as required, fail to post a bond in connection with voluntary departure, or fail to comply with any other condition or term in 
connection with voluntary departure, you must surrender for removal on the next business day thereafter. If you do not surrender for removal as 
required, you will be ineligible for all forms of discretionary relief for as long as you remain in die United States and for ten years after departure or 
removal. This means you will be ineligible for asylum, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, change of nonimmigrant 
status, registry, and related waivers for this period. If you do not surrender lor removal as required, you may also be criminally prosecuted under 
section 243 of the Act. 
Request for Prompt Hearing 
To expedite a determination in my case, 1 request an immediate hearing. I waive my right to a 10-day period prior to appearing before an immigration 
judge. 
. * (Stgiuiltirc ofRrtfMHU'nl) , I 
" /j' Date: 
Before: 
~7T (Signature and Tide of Immigration Officer} 
°i p W / / t 
7 7' 
Certificate of Service 
This Notice To Appear was served on the respondent by me on September 29, 2010, in the following manner and in compliance with section 
239(a)(1)(F) of the Act. 
[x] in person • by certified mail, returned receipt requested O by regular mail 
Q Attached is a credible fear worksheet. 
Q^Attached is a list of organization and attorneys which provide free legal services. 
English . 
The alien was provided oral notice in the language of the time and place of his or her hearing and ol the 
(Consequences of failure to appear as provided in section 240(b)(7) of the Act. ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ - - ^ ^ 
y f . ' MARTIN I£iiR$S!tC8^^ DEPORTATION OFFICER 
< S * „ W of l^muWin»cr«m;,U> Served) ^ " > ^ (Sif««».c and I illc of nllkcr) 
